

Message Text

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73

ACTION ACDA-19

INFO OCT-01 ARA-16 EUR-25 EA-11 IO-13 ADP-00 AF-10 CIAE-00

DODE-00 PM-07 H-03 INR-10 L-03 NASA-04 NEA-10 NSAE-00

NSC-10 OIC-04 PA-03 PRS-01 RSC-01 SCI-06 SS-15

MBFR-03 USIA-15 SAJ-01 RSR-01 /192 W

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FM USMISSION GENEVA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1446

INFO AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY BRASILIA

AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY MEXICO

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

AMEMBASSY TOKYO

AMEMBASSY VIENNA

USUN NEWYORK 9649

USMISSION NATO

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AEC GERMANTOWN

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DISTO

IN ANSWER TO CHARGES THAT THERE IS LITTLE LEFT TO BE
LEARNED FROM FURTHER TESTING, HE SAID EVEN MINOR DESIGN
IMPROVEMENTS COULD BE SIGNIFICANT. MARTIN REITERATED
US WILLINGNESS TO GIVE UP MILITARY ADVANTAGES OF TESTING
IF WE CAN BE ASSURED PURSUANT TO AN ADEQUATELY VERIFIED
TREATY THAT OTHER PARTIES HAVE GIVEN UP SAME ADVANTAGES.

4. AMB HAINWORTH REFERRED COMMITTEE TO "WELL KNOWN" UK
VIEWS ON CHEMICAL WEAPONS AS PRESENTED IN FEBRUARY
(CCD/PV 587). HE SAID THERE HAD BEEN CONSTRUCTIVE
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COMMENTS MADE ON SOVIET 1972 CW DRAFT CONVENTION AND
EXPRESSED VIEW THAT SOVIETS MIGHT NOW BE EXPECTED TO
COME FORTH WITH REVISIONS WHICH WOULD REFLECT THE RECOG-
NITION THAT CW AGREEMENT COULD NOT BE FORMULATED ALONG

SAME LINES AS BW CONVENTION. RE CTB, HE REITERATED UK SUPPORT FOR AN ADEQUATELY VERIFIED TREATY.

5. WITH RESPECT TO THE SWEDISH IDEA FOR AN INTERNATIONAL DISARMAMENT ORGANIZATION AMB HAINWORTH EMPHASIZED THAT EVEN IF BROUGHT INTO BEING FOR SOME OTHER PURPOSE, IDO (WHICH WOULD BE "SERVANT OF THE UN") SHOULD NOT CONCERN ITSELF WITH REVIEW CONFERENCE FOR NPT. HE EXPRESSED UK VIEW THAT IT IS RESPONSIBILITY OF US, UK AND USSR AS DEPOSITARY POWERS TO INITIATE THE REVIEW CONFERENCE AND MAKE ADMINISTRATIVE ARRANGEMENTS, AFTER APPROPRIATE CONSULTATIONS WITH OTHER PARTIES. HE SAID CONFERENCE MUST BE LIMITED TO NPT PARTIES BUT THAT THEY MIGHT INVITE BODY SUCH AS IAEA FOR CONSULTATIVE PURPOSES.

6. RE SWEDISH CALL FOR GOVERNMENTS TO REEXAMINE RESERVATIONS TO GENEVA PROTOCOL OF 1925, HE SUGGESTED THAT RESERVATION ON FREEDOM TO RETALIATE MAY HAVE STRENGTHENED PROTOCOL AND ALSO THAT ANY REVIEW OF RESERVATIONS MIGHT AWAIT RESULTS OF CCD NEGOTIATIONS ON PRODUCTION AND POSSESSION OF CW AND DETERMINATION OF WHETHER PROHIBITION ON USE WILL BE INCLUDED. HE THOUGHT NEGOTIATION OF CONTROL ON USE OF A PARTICULAR WEAPON, SUCH AS NAPALM, BELONGED IN AN ARMS CONTROL FORUM RATHER THAN THE DIPLOMATIC CONFERENCE ON INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW, AS MRS. MYRDAL HAD SUGGESTED.

7. HAINWORTH REPLIED TO SWEDISH QUESTIONS ON "MINI-NUKES" (FULL TEXT SEPTEL, NOTAL). HE SAID THAT UK REMAINS CONSCIOUS OF THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN NUCLEAR AND CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS, AND AS FAR AS UK CONCERNED, NO DECISION HAS BEEN TAKEN TO DEVELOP, TEST OR DEPLOY MINI-NUKES. HE ASKED THE SWEDISH DEL HOW A COUNTRY COULD KNOW, UNDER A CTB, IF SUCH SMALL WEAPONS WERE BEING DEVELOPED SINCE TESTING OF SMALL YIELD DEVICES MIGHT NOT BE DETECTED OR IDENTIFIED. HE SUGGESTED LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
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THAT THIS IS GOOD EXAMPLE OF IMPORTANCE OF ADEQUATELY AND EFFECTIVELY VERIFYING A CTB. IN ANSWER TO SWEDISH QUESTION ON MINI-NUKES IN RELATION TO 1968 UN RESOLUTION ON ASSURANCES, HE SAID THE UK INTERPRETS THE RESOLUTION AS APPLYING TO NUCLEAR AGGRESSION OF ANY TYPE.

8. HE SAID THAT, BASED ON THE EXPERIENCE IN DISCUSSING THE ADVISABILITY OF CONVENING A WORLD DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE, IT IS HARD TO SEE MERIT IN IDEA OF CONVENING UN DISARMAMENT COMMISSION AS A STOP-GAP. HE REPEATED UK VIEW THAT DISARMAMENT FORUM WOULD BE

DESIRABLE IF ALL FIVE NUCLEAR POWERS ACTIVELY PARTICIPATED IN IT. HE SAID THAT BEST COURSE TO FOLLOW ON THIS QUESTION WOULD BE TO CONTINUE "QUIET DIPLOMACY."

9. AMB GUERREIRO STATED THAT THE CCD HAD REACHED END OF ANOTHER YEAR WITHOUT TANGIBLE RESULTS. WITH REGARD TO CW DELIBERATIONS, THE COMMENTS OF THE US, SOVIET AND OTHER DELS HAD, HOWEVER, SERVED TO MAKE THEIR POSITIONS MORE PRECISE. HE DISCUSSED DIFFERENCES OF APPROACH WHICH HAD BEEN DELINEATED, MOST NOTABLY WITH RESPECT TO SCOPE OF THE BAN. HE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT VERIFICATION IS REAL CRUX OF THE DIFFICULTIES IN REACHING AGREEMENT, BUT SAID THAT VERIFICATION REQUIREMENTS SET FORTH BY THE US SEEMED TO GO BEYOND WHAT THE NON-ALIGNED TEN-NATION MEMORANDUM HAD EXPRESSED. ON THE OTHER HAND, CONTROL SYSTEM FAVORED BY THE SOVIETS AND THEIR ALLIES AMOUNTS TO LESS THAN WHAT THE TEN-NATION MEMORANDUM STIPULATED. HE SAID THAT WITHOUT WANTING TO UNDERESTIMATE THE CONTINUING PRESENTATION OF ANALYSES AND SUGGESTIONS, SUCH AS THOSE SUBMITTED ON 21 AUG BY JAPANESE AND CANADIANS, HE FELT CCD MUST ADVANCE WITH RAL CW NEGOTIATIONS OR COME TO YET ANOTHER DEAD-END. GUERREIRO SAID A MEASURE ALLOWING CHEMICAL WEAPONS TO BE KEPT EVEN AFTER AN UNDERTAKING IS IN FORCE NOT TO DEVELOP OR PRODUCE THEM WOULD BE DISCRIMINATORY.

10. HE POINTED OUT THAT DISCUSSIONS ON CTB QUESTION HAD ALSO REACHED AN IMPASSE, WITH THE WEST MAINTAINING LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
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THAT VERIFICATION BY NATIONAL MEANS IS NOT ADEQUATE AND THE COMMUNIST COUNTRIES CLAIMING THAT ALL THAT IS LACKING IS POLITICAL WILL. HE SAID ARMS CONTROL TREATIES SUCCESSFULLY NEGOTIATED TO DATE WERE NOT OF MILITARY SIGNIFICANCE TO THE GREAT POWERS, WITH ONE EXCEPTION, AND THEY DID NOT THEREFORE REQUIRE DIRECT CONTROLS TO MONITOR THEM. EXCEPTION WAS THE NPT WITH ITS IAEA SAFEGUARDS. HE CONCLUDED BY ASKING, RHETORICALLY, IF THE CCD WAS TO CONTINUE TO TACKLE THE PROBLEMS OF DISARMAMENT WITHOUT ANY MEANINGFUL RESULTS.

11. NETHERLANDS DEL TABLED A WORKING PAPER (CCD/416) CONTAINING SOME OBSERVATIONS ON THE VERIFICATION OF A BAN ON UNDERGROUND NUCLEAR TEST EXPLOSIONS.

12. NEXT MEETING ON THURSDAY, AUGUST 30.

DECONTROL AFTER AUG 28, 1974.BASSIN

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To: STATE
BONN
BRASILIA
LONDON
MEXICO
MOSCOW
TOKYO

VIENNA
USUN NEWYORK
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